

Coverage with Evidence Development

False Hope: Bone Marrow

Transplantation for Breast Cancer

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
Health Industry Forum

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Multiple Methodologies

- Literature searches & analyses; document analyses; both comprehensive & focused
- Review of media coverage (Nexus-Lexis)
- Interviews-snowball ID; semi-structured; repeats; face-to-face, telephone, & site visits
- Legal analysis: (1) all reported cases 1988-2002 (4 jury trials, 88 litigated) & leading cases; (2) interviews of defense & plaintiffs' lawyers
- Utilization data: HCUP, Registry; Response
- Clinical trials: systematic review methods

The HDC/ABMT Experience




The Fateful Branching: Two Pathways, Two “Systems”

- The “Rational System” of Evaluation
 - Emphasizes systematic evaluation of evidence by technology assessments, clinical practice guidelines, & randomized clinical trials
- The “Default System” of Clinical Use
 - Reflects uncoordinated action driven by Phase 2 studies, patients, physicians, lawyers, media, entrepreneurs, state & federal governments

The Face of the Patient

- Pamela Pirozzi 1989; Arlene Betzner 1990; Angela Davis 1988-92; Ricki Dienst; Anne Grant; Virginia Hetrick
- Est. 23,000-40,000 women received HDC/ABMT for breast cancer; ~600 premature deaths; ~1,000 on protocol
- Median age, 1993-2000, 44-47 years
- Median length of stay, 24 - 19 days
- Median charges, \$103,924 - \$71,760; est. total cost over 10 years, \$2 billion
- Payers: PPO/FFS, 53.9%; HMO, 23.4%

Number of Women with Breast Cancer and High Dose Chemotherapy 1993-2001



The Basic Issues

- Access to new treatments:
 - Claims of individuals vs. those of society?
- Evaluation: What is essential?
 - Phase 2 studies vs. Phase 3 RCTs
 - RCTs generally required for Breast CA treatments
- Role of health insurers:
 - Require evidence or pay for experimental therapy (conflicts with exp/invest exclusion)?

What is a Medical Procedure?

- No adequate lexicon exists to describe medical interventions comprehensively
- Narrowly defined, a procedure is what a physician does to a patient as specified in *Current Procedural Terminology, Standard Edition*
- Broadly defined, a procedure is any medical intervention that is not a therapeutic product, especially not a drug

Emergence of a Procedure

- Elements of HDC/ABMT for breast cancer:
 - Combination chemotherapy
 - Adjuvant chemotherapy
 - High-dose chemotherapy
 - Bone marrow transplantation
 - Growth factors
- Phase 2 studies (single-site, small numbers)
- Transplanters and a defining procedure

The HDC/AMBT Procedure

- Administering standard chemotherapy to determine tumor responsiveness, then . . .
- Harvesting bone marrow and/or stem cells
- Administering HDC (2X-10X standard dose)
- Reinfusing bone marrow and/or stem cells
- Adding growth factor
- Providing supportive care & monitoring for substantial toxicity of the procedure

Evaluation: Drugs vs. Procedures

- New Drugs
 - Required by FDA; prescribed in law, regulation & other guidance documents
 - Financed by sponsors
- New Procedures
 - Negotiated between medical profession & insurers
 - Financing uncertain
 - NIH/NCI
 - Insurers: any role?
 - Standard coverage?
 - CED?

Drivers of Clinical Use: The Default System

- Phase 2 studies & physician legitimation
- Patient demand & physician advice
- Litigation
- The print & broadcast media
- Entrepreneurial oncology & the “market”
- State & federal government mandates

Legitimation of Use & Evaluation

- Medicine (esp. oncology) has high legitimacy:
 - FDA should facilitate access to new cancer drugs
 - Phase 2 studies generate “promise”
 - Standard of care is elastic
 - Promising therapy becomes best chance for a cure
 - Concept of “best available therapy”
 - “Dream Team” document argues effectiveness
 - Physician advocacy is unconstrained by science
- Health insurers have very low or no legitimacy:
 - Unevaluated treatments not covered or reimbursed
 - Clinical research not the business of insurers
 - Coverage denials invite challenges

Litigation Trends

(“Maddeningly Unpredictable”)

- Fox v. HealthNet, 1993: \$89 M verdict
- Litigation peaks in 1993-94
- No pre- or post-Fox outcome differences
 - 1988-1993: insurers, 17; patients, 16
 - 1994-2002: insurers, 26; patients, 28
 - Four jury verdicts are mixed
- Settlements strongly favor patients after Fox

Primary Legal Issues

- Contract interpretation:
 - exp/invest exclusion; medical necessity clause; chemotherapy coverage; BMT coverage; specific HDC/ABMT exclusion
- Standard of care
- Informed consent
- Bad faith denial of claims
- Expert witnesses & clinical trial evidence
- Sympathy & emotion


Attorneys' Perspectives

- Defense attorneys
 - Cases never winnable: sympathetic patients; arrogant administrators
 - Relied on testimony of medical directors:
 - HDC experimental
 - Few experts
 - Physician opponents unwilling to testify
 - Reasonable exclusions, not bad faith
 - Appropriate venue: clinical trials
- Plaintiffs' attorneys
 - Contractual ambiguity used to undermine exclusion
 - Community oncology demonstrated wide use
 - Relied on Peters & Antman to counter experimental
 - Insurers acted in bad faith by inconsistency
 - Appropriate venue: court trials

Entrepreneurial Oncology

- Oncology non-existent as a subspecialty in 1971
 - Rapid growth of community oncologists
- Response Technologies/Response Oncology
 - IMPACT Centers: between academic centers and oncologist's office (an intermediate site of care)
 - Protocols: registered trials with FDA; but no RCTs
 - Centralized data collection; publications
- Not-for-profit academic oncology deemed inaccessible for many patients “needing” ABMT

Response Technologies/Oncology: Number of Centers



OPM Mandates Coverage of HDC/ABMT for Breast Cancer

- U.S. House of Representatives: August 1994 hearing
 - Women’s health issue emphasized
 - “Coin-flip” trials derided
 - OPM reliance on NCI severed
- Office of Personnel Management FEHBP
 - HDC/ABMT coverage denied beforehand
 - “Change of heart” experienced afterwards

State Mandated Coverage of HDC/ABMT for Breast Cancer (1996)

Massachusetts

Minnesota

Florida

Georgia

Kentucky

California

Louisiana

Tennessee

Missouri

New Hampshire

New Jersey

Virginia

Ohio

New York

Rhode Island

Connecticut

The “Rational” Evaluation System

- Technology assessments – Insurers, others
- Randomized clinical trials - NCI
- Clinical practice guidelines - NCCN
- Systematic reviews of evidence - Cochrane
- Audits of randomized trials
 - U.S.: Cancer cooperative groups
 - International

Technology Assessments

- NCHSR/OHTA: 1988
- BCBSA: 1988, 1990, 1996
 - David Eddy, J Clinical Oncology, 1992
 - Bezwoda 1995; HDC “not worse than” standard chemo
- Aetna: MCOP & **independent medical review**
- ECRI: 1993; 1994-95; **patient brochure**
- Others: BSC; TAG; ICSI
- **BUT** 1990 “*Dream Team*” document argued for coverage (Peters, Lippman, Bonadonna, DeVita, Holland, and Rosner)

Health Insurers & HDC/ABMT Clinical Trials

- HDC/ABMT advocates (researchers & physicians):
 - Insurers should finance clinical trials
 - Insurers should finance “standard of care” treatment
- Insurers respond (predictively & creatively):
 - Coverage of HDC/ABMT typically denied
 - US HealthCare: financed the “Philadelphia trial”
 - BCBSA: established the Demonstration Project
 - Aetna: launched independent medical review (MCOP)


BCBSA TEC Clinical Trial Demonstration Project

- Standard coverage
 - Part of reimbursement
 - Paid for by plans
 - Post-pay for procedure
 - Existing contracts, often w/ BMT centers
 - Paid from premiums
 - Existing plan-based offices & staff
- Demonstration project
 - Not in reimbursement
 - Paid by BCBSA
 - Pre-paid for procedure
 - New contracts
 - Paid from other sources
 - Dedicated central office & staff
 - Based on “equipoise”

NCI High-Priority Clinical Trials

- CALGB 9082/ INT-0163 (1991;1999, 2005)
- PBT-01 => E/PBT-01 (1990-91; 1999, 2000)
- ECOG 2190/INT-0121 (1991-2, 2003)
- SWOG 9623 (1996, 2005)

US Clinical Trials Accrual



Interactions between Systems

- Clinical use enhanced perversely by evaluation:
 - Initiation of Phase 3 RCTs *validates* Phase 2 “promise”
 - Phase 2 authorizes physician discretion & enthusiasm
- Evaluation suffers from widespread clinical use:
 - Recruitment of patients is harder when there is easy access (and coverage) for off-protocol treatment
 - Norms of science do not govern “cross-over” activity, e.g., “expert” testimony, or policy advocacy
- But successful evaluation *may* affect clinical use

ASCO Meeting, May 1999

- Run up to ASCO Meeting:
 - NCI Director's meeting, 2/99: How do we announce the results of trials?
 - Trial news posted on NCI & ASCO websites in April
- ASCO Meeting:
 - ECOG/PBT-01: Stadtmauer: metastatic, no benefit
 - CALGB: Peters; DSMB; high-risk, no benefit
 - Sweden: J Bergh: no benefit
 - S Africa (Bezwoda 2): benefit
 - France (PEGASE): poster session, no benefit

South African Trial Audits

- US cancer trials require audits
- Bezwoda 2 (ASCO 1999)
 - Can we (U.S. researchers) replicate these results?
 - Let's do an audit: complex front-end discussions
 - Audit finds fraud; retractions – ASCO, Lancet
- Bezwoda 1 (1995)
 - Only trial reporting benefit; published in *JCO*
 - Influential in reinforcing clinical use
 - U of Witwatersrand invites Weiss back
 - Fraud uncovered once again

Conclusion 1: Initial Conditions (1988-92) Dominate the Story

- Phase 2 studies proliferate & report “promise”
- Media reports highlight patient stories
- Litigation begins
- Insurers deny coverage
- “Standard of care” legitimated
- Entrepreneurs recognize the “market”
- Phase 3 RCTs initiated & proceed slowly
- **Intervene at Phase 2 => Phase 3 transition**

Conclusion 2: Conflicting Values Are All-pervasive:

- Early access vs. adequate evaluation
- Individual benefit (potential) now vs. collective benefit later
- Experimental procedure vs. standard of care
- Policy discussions emphasize improving “rational system,” not disabling the “default system”
- **Protect integrity of evaluation process & provide safety valve for individual cases**


Conclusion 3: Institutional Deficit Exists for Evaluating Procedures

- No FDA-equivalent requires evaluation of procedures
 - FDA assets: statute, regulations, administrative agency, history, culture, venue for addressing issues
- Financing evaluation of procedures is problematic
- **Public-private partnership recommended**

Public-private Partnership

- Purpose: evaluate *procedures* by RCTs
- Partners: NCI (or NIH), researchers, insurers, patients
- Actions:
 - Describe Phase 2 promise & articulate Phase 3 rationale
 - Limit access to new procedures to randomized trials
 - Provide for review of individual cases
- Benefits:
 - Parties acknowledge mutual dependence on & common interest in clinical effectiveness
 - Researchers obtain insurer financing of RCTs
 - Provide insurers some litigation protection
 - Public obtains timely data on clinical effectiveness

The HDC/ABMT Experience



Publications

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